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I
Morten Kyndrup kindly invited me to open this conference by sketch-
ing how the problematic question of limits has pervaded the contempor-
ary field of aesthetics, and he suggested I do so by sketching how the 
issue of limits has shaped my own trajectory from analytic philosophy to 
pragmatism and continental theory and into the interdisciplinary field of 
somaesthetics.* Reviewing my almost thirty-year career in philosophical 
aesthetics, I realize that much of it has been a struggle with the limits that 
define this field, though I did not always see it in those terms. 
When I was still a student at Oxford specializing in analytic aesthetics, 
my first three publications were papers protesting the limits of prevail-
ing monistic doctrines in that field: theories claiming that poetry (and by 
extension literature in general) is essentially an oral-based performative 
art without real visual import, and theories arguing that beneath the vary-
ing interpretations and evaluations of works of art there was nonetheless 
one basic logic of interpretation and one basic logic of evaluation (though 
philosophers differed as to what that basic logic was and whether it was 
the same for both interpretation and evaluation). When I proposed con-
trastingly pluralistic accounts of interpretive and evaluative logic, while 
suggesting that literature could be appreciated in terms of sight as well as 
sound, I was not consciously aiming at transgressing prevailing limits. I 
was more interested in being right than in being different or original, and 
I saw myself as working fully within the limits of analytic aesthetics.1 
When I expanded my horizons to embrace pragmatism in the late 
1980s, I became conscious of pushing at the limits of analytic philosophy, 
though I considered my work to be largely an extension of treating famil-
iar questions and forms of reasoning in analytic aesthetics and philosophy, 
much in the way that Nelson Goodman, Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, 
and Joseph Margolis were combining pragmatist insights with analytic 
styles of argument.2 And in using some continental philosophy for inspir-
ational insight (from Nietzsche and Adorno to Foucault and Bourdieu), I 
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could assure myself that the most respected analytic philosopher of art, 
Arthur Danto, had built much of his theory on Hegel. Of course, when 
my book Pragmatist Aesthetics devoted its largest chapter to the analysis 
and advocacy of hip hop, I could no longer pretend to myself that I was 
essentially working within the traditional limits of analytic or even prag-
matist aesthetics. Formerly friendly colleagues began to identify me as a 
sensationalist transgressor of hallowed boundaries of academic philoso-
phy, reminding me through painful words or even more painfully silent 
shunning that I had passed beyond limits that defined acceptable work in 
analytic aesthetics.3 Though my new work continued to command a dis-
tanced respect (and was even appreciatively used by analytic colleagues 
to save them the time of reading pragmatist and continental authors for 
themselves), I could no longer fully be trusted. My subsequent turn to 
somaesthetics, crowned by professional training as a somatic educator in 
the Feldenkrais Method, confirmed my image as Grenzgänger, a border-
crosser, a transgressor of boundaries.4 Like it or not (and initially I greatly 
disliked it), I had evolved from a mainstream analytic aesthetician into a 
limit-defying provocateur, who had to be kept at some distance from the 
inner circles of power within that mainstream establishment however 
much it accorded my work a respectful hearing. 
Pierre Bourdieu once suggested, in conversation, a sociological expla-
nation of this trajectory: my bi-national, transcultural background, which 
tends to make outsider status and boundary crossing a necessity of life, 
would promote a habitus of transgressing limits that would likely be mir-
rored in philosophical work. Though I had seemed to achieve insider status 
in analytic aesthetics (as editor of a Blackwell collection on that topic and as 
tenured in Temple’s philosophy department that was famous for analytic 
aesthetics), this insider persona could not really fit my entrenched habitus 
as a displaced intellectual, a wandering Jew who had left America for Israel 
at age sixteen, and who then experienced outsider status there and again 
at Oxford before returning, in my mid-thirties, as a stranger to the States 
though frequently leaving again for extended periods in France, Germany, 
and Japan. Perhaps Bourdieu was right. But more interesting than such so-
cial self-analysis, however, is the much broader hypothesis that I wish to ex-
plore in this lecture: that the play of limit transgression is a central feature 
of the field of aesthetics, a key aspect of its history and structure.
II
Modern aesthetics defined itself from the beginning as transgressing 
boundaries and exceeding limits. Baumgarten introduced aesthetics pre-
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cisely to extend philosophy beyond the limits of conceptual knowledge 
and into the sphere of sensory perceptions and what he calls “the lower 
cognitive faculties.” As he insists in paragraph 3 of Aesthetica’s “Prole-
gomena,” one of aesthetics’ goals is “improving knowledge also beyond 
the borders of the distinctly knowable” (“Die Verbesserung der Erkennt­
nis auch über die Grenzen des deutlich Erkennbaren hinaus vorantreibt”). 
There is a basic logic at play here: To justify a new philosophical discipline 
or science like aesthetics, he must argue that it is needed to go beyond the 
limits of the studies we already have, that it occupies a place beyond the 
boundaries defined by other fields. Hence Baumgarten likewise defends 
the need for aesthetics by saying it goes beyond the limits of Rhetorik 
and Poetik by comprehending a larger field (“Sie umfasst ein weiteres Ge­
biet”) by including also objects of other arts. Nor can aesthetics be simply 
equated with critique or with art, Baumgarten argues, because critique in 
general includes critique of logic while aesthetics is said to deal specifi-
cally with matters of sensibility, and because aesthetics is claimed to be a 
science (Wissenschaft) rather than just an art.5
Beyond Baumgarten, the modern field of aesthetics can be seen as an 
attempt to go beyond the limits of older philosophies of beauty, sublimity, 
and taste to engage a much wider domain of qualities and judgments relat-
ing to our pleasurable and meaningful experience of art and nature. And 
we can see the essential move of Hegelian aesthetics (and other aesthetic 
idealisms) as moving the essence of aesthetics beyond the limits of sensu-
ous and nonconceptual experience toward the idea of art as purveying the 
very highest spiritual truths albeit in a somewhat sensuous form. More-
over, we can certainly see modernity’s progressive revolutions of artistic 
forms and styles in the same Hegelian spirit of dynamic movement that 
progresses by meeting and overcoming determinations of boundaries.
We may have forgotten the limit-defying trend in aesthetics because 
the dominant Anglo-American aesthetic school of the last half century, 
analytic aesthetics, has been keen to insist on defining limits and on polic-
ing them. Initially, it had the best of reasons to stress the need for more 
recognition of limits and distinctions in order to remedy the limit-defy-
ing confusions of the dominant aesthetic idealism of the early twentieth 
century, perhaps most powerfully exemplified in Benedetto Croce. As I 
have elsewhere argued, analytic aesthetics emerged largely from dissatis-
faction with the wooly vagueness of idealist, Hegelian-inspired aesthetic 
theories such as Croce’s that affirm a more unbounded aesthetics whose 
project is limit defiance.6 
Croce’s project was shaped by a struggle to defend the transcendent 
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power of aesthetic insight from the limitations of encroaching positivisms 
with respect to art’s meaning: whether such positivism was expressed 
by subordinating artistic creation and evaluation to the strict rules of 
genre criticism or to historical and sociological causal explanations, such 
as Hippolyte Taine’s famous formula of “race, milieu, and moment.”7 For 
Croce, who defines the aesthetic in terms of a basic formative power of 
intuition that pervades all meaningful perception, aesthetics cannot be 
confined to a narrow domain of poetics and fine arts nor to questions of 
natural beauty. The aesthetic instead is a fundamental principle of intu-
itive perception that pervades the experienced world as a whole. All the 
world, Croce argues, is essentially a matter of aesthetics, since “all this 
world is intuition, “is nothing but intuition or aesthetic fact.”8
Identifying intuition with expression and language, and insisting that 
the nature of intuitions and language is “perpetual creation” and change, 
Croce argues that any attempt to limit aesthetic intuition into fixed bound-
aries, categories, or meanings is as useless and perverse as “to seek the im-
mobility of motion.” Traditional limits of aesthetic genres and rhetorical 
categories are thus completely swept away: “Expression is an indivisible 
whole,” Croce claims, hence “a philosophical classification of expressions 
is impossible, for there is no essential distinguishing principles or fixed 
“formal differences” to justify such categorial limits, only differences of 
degree and context and changing convention. The same goes for the al-
leged limits between artist, critic, and audience; and even art and non-art. 
“The limits of the expressions and inuitions that are called art, as opposed 
to those that are vulgarly called non-art, are empirical and impossible to 
define. If an epigram be art, why not a single word?” Challenging not only 
the limits but even the standard distinctions between disciplines, Croce 
affirms that “philosophy of language and philosophy of art are the same 
thing.” By asserting that traditional aesthetic distinctions cannot rely on 
fixed essential principles since aesthetic perception is always a matter of 
the changing play of language and experience, yet failing to equally in-
sist that pragmatic distinctions can nonetheless be usefully made, Croce’s 
theory falls into a much wider essentialism, a monism of the world as 
intuition-expression or language. (Deconstruction, I have argued, in pur-
suing a very similar argument against the foundations and fixity of genre 
and disciplinary distinctions, also tends to fall into the trap of linguistic 
essentialism where all the world is nothing but text.9)
Analytic aesthetics emerged as a power in the mid-twentieth century 
by attacking the influential Crocean view for the dreary, vague, and ap-
parently useless monotony of its distinction-demolishing essentialism. 
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By that time, art no longer required to be defended against reduction-
ist explanatory models, whether of traditional rhetoric or of sociological 
determinism. This was because more autonomously aesthetic varieties 
of art and literary criticism had by then been firmly established, such 
as that advocated by the New Criticism. Croce’s early analytic critics did 
not generally maintain that the genre distinctions Croce dismissed could 
be justified by appeal to real metaphysical essences or to tradition. On 
the contrary, they themselves offered critical revisions of traditional es-
sentialisms about art and its genres. But they did maintain that in order 
to talk illuminatingly about art, one must draw some distinctions and 
respect some limits of signification of one’s theoretical terms; and that to 
define these boundaries more clearly and maintain them more consist-
ently could promote better ways of talking about art. 
Monroe Beardsley, for example, in distinguishing the perceptual object 
from its physical base and authorial intention, explicitly argued that since 
there is no essence of the aesthetic object to be discovered, we have “to 
propose a way of making the distinction” which itself can only be jus-
tified pragmatically. “One can only point to the conveniences of adopting 
it, the inconveniences of rejecting it, …[and] its own inconveniences.”10 
Similarly, John Passmore, in complaining of “the dreariness of aesthetics” 
prescribed the remedy of “a ruthlessness in making distinctions,” in draw-
ing limits that may “seem arbitrary” but can be justified pragmatically by 
the fact that certain distinctions or limits can structure the aesthetic field 
in a way that “gives rise to interesting generalizations.”11 He even sug-
gested that the dullness of aesthetics arises from the attempt to construct 
a subject where there isn’t one, “that there is no aesthetics and yet there 
are principles of literary criticism, musical criticism, etc. and that gen-
eral aesthetics should be abandoned “for an intensive special study of the 
separate arts,” whose specific differences should be respected. But most 
analysts in aesthetics still pursued projects of finding general limits to 
distinguish aesthetics from other fields. J.O. Urmson, for example, argued 
that “We should expect to find a criterion which allows us to distinguish 
the aesthetic, the moral, the economic, the intellectual, and other evalu-
ations by a single fundamentum divisionis,” and that “to call an appreci-
ation aesthetic has as part of its point the effect of ruling out the moral as 
irrelevant.”12 Stuart Hampshire devoted an entire article “Ethics and Ap-
preciation” to arguing likewise that the ethical and aesthetic judgments 
were entirely different in logical form, and that aesthetics should confine 




The history of analytic philosophy’s attempts to draw firm and convincing 
distinctions can instructively illustrate how aesthetics tends to resist clear 
and strict limits. Analysts such as Beardsley and Urmson tried to distin-
guish the aesthetic from the non-aesthetic in terms of the former’s being 
narrowly concerned with the perceptual appearance or surface “look of 
things.”14 Yet this appearance-based limit was shown to break down once 
we realize that what we know about an artwork’s material pro perties and 
purpose will in fact affect, and should affect, how that work appears to us, 
thus reversing the primacy of appearance over non-perceptual knowledge 
in aesthetic appreciation. Other analysts, such as Frank Sibley, tried to 
draw a sharp aesthetic/non-aesthetic limit in terms of the alleged logically 
anomalous and independent status of aesthetic terms, the claim being 
that such terms were neither rule-governed nor conditioned by and infer-
able from any set of non-aesthetic features of the artwork but instead rely 
on aesthetic taste alone for their application.15 Yet closer analysis showed 
that this alleged independence from non-aesthetic properties could not 
be maintained, since aesthetic properties had to be at least causally and 
ontologically dependent on the work’s other properties, and since it was 
clear that the prominent presence of some non-aesthetic properties (such 
as great size, mass, weight, bulky shape) could entail that certain aes-
thetic properties (such as delicate fragility) would not be appropriate for 
describing the work.16 Moreover, predicates such as unity and balance 
seemed to straddle the alleged distinction since they could be conceived 
in both aesthetic and non-aesthetic (computational) terms. 
Similarly, the attempt to limit aesthetics to a realm devoid of all ethi-
cal considerations met the insurmountable difficulty that ethical content 
so often deeply pervaded the artwork’s meaning that the work could not 
be properly understood without attending to its ethical dimensions. At-
tempts to distinguish a special aesthetic attitude or a special aesthetic 
experience that is limited to artworks and natural beauty (and arises al-
ways and only in their presence) have likewise proven very problematic, 
to such an extent that analysts have persistently questioned whether the 
notions of aesthetic attitude and aesthetic experience are at all useful for 
defining the field. 
Increasingly aware of the problem of determining the limits of the aes-
thetic, analytic philosophers have devoted increasingly greater attention 
to defining instead the limits of art. Two different limit-defining projects 
can be noted here: first, drawing the boundaries of the realm of art as a 
whole in contrast to the rest of life and what Danto calls “mere real things”; 
Somaesthetics at the Limits
13
and, secondly, defining the specific borders of individual artworks, i.e., the 
borders that mark off a true instance of the given work (say a genuine 
text or performance of Hamlet, or an authentic copy of an etching) from 
objects that are inauthentic presentations, copies, or forgeries of the art-
works they claim to be. Both these projects aim at perfectly covering the 
extension of the concepts they define (whether art as a whole or a particu-
lar artwork) by providing a verbal formula that would fit all and only the 
right objects for the concept in question: namely, with respect to the gen-
eral concept of art, those objects that are accepted as works of art; or, with 
respect to a particular artwork, those objects or events that are accepted as 
authentic instances of the particular work in question (in painting most 
often this is a single instance). 
Any proposed definition of this sort can be challenged by bringing 
counterexamples that its verbal formula would either wrongly cover or 
fail to cover and so would either wrongly include or exclude from art’s do-
main or from the particular artwork’s authentic instances. The proposed 
definition is thus shown to be either too wide or too narrow; its motivat-
ing ideal is perfect coverage, and I have therefore called this definitional 
style “the wrapper model of theory.” For like the better food wraps, such 
theories of art transparently present, contain, and conserve their object – 
our conventional view of art. They aim to preserve rather than transform 
art’s practice and experience. Like the condom, another form of elastic 
transparent wrapper (which the French aptly designate “preservatif ”), 
such definitions aim to preserve the conventional limits of art (and thus 
art itself) from contamination by art’s exciting yet impure enveloping en-
vironment while at the same time preserving that environment from art’s 
potential to create new life by its penetration beyond the limits that seek 
to compartmentalize it within the established artworld and within the 
established criteria of legitimately authentic performances or instances 
of a particular artwork.
Let us first consider the issue of defining the limits of the particular 
artwork’s identity. This was of crucial importance to analytic aesthetics 
as part of its preoccupation with art’s objects that in turn arose from 
academic criticism’s preoccupation with objective critical truth, which 
seemed to demand a clearly defined object to serve as the standard of 
truth. Thus Beardsley claimed, “The first thing to make criticism possible 
is an object … with its own properties against which interpretations can 
be checked,” and artworks therefore must be such “self-sufficient entities” 
whose properties and meaning are independent of their contexts of gen-
esis and reception.17 The object of art becomes a fetishized “icon” whose 
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limits of identity and authenticity must be strictly defined and protected 
from fakes and corruptions.18 But we see, in Nelson Goodman’s influential 
theory of work-identity, how the need for precisely defining the work’s 
identity leads to the paradoxical result of defining it independently of its 
aesthetically important properties, since such properties are too vague 
and variable for clear definitions. Since, for Goodman, the identity of a 
musical work is defined by the notes of the score, the most miserable 
performance without actual mistakes counts as fully authentic “while the 
most brilliant performance with one wrong note does not.”19 But what 
is the real point of defining an artwork to preserve it if the aesthetically 
important properties of that work are not meant to be preserved? Is 
it not more fruitful to concentrate on preserving or enriching the aes-
thetic values of aesthetic experience, even if this involves admitting 
some wrong notes or letters or reproductions? Such analytic perver-
sities helped push me toward pragmatism, as did the analytic attempts 
to define art in general.
The most influential of these attempts to define art have likewise tried 
to do so without appealing to the notion of the aesthetic (whose limits 
and essence analysis had earlier failed to effectively define). Instead these 
theories define art in terms of something beyond aesthetic perception 
but alleged as necessary for shaping such perception in appreciating art 
– namely, the artworld, a notion that Arthur Danto introduced to analytic 
aesthetics through his beloved example of Warhol’s Brillo Boxes and that 
George Dickie then interpreted in terms of the institutional theory of art. 
That institutional theory, which defines an artwork as simply any “artifact 
upon which some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social 
institution (the artworld) has conferred the status of candidate for ap-
preciation,”20 is purely procedural, leaving all substantive decisions and 
principles to the artworld. By stressing this social context through which 
art is generated and provided with properties not directly exhibited to 
the senses (properties that distinguish between Warhol’s Brillo Boxes and 
their visually identical counterparts), the institutional theory can explain 
how art can have a definitional essence without its objects sharing a core 
of exhibited aesthetic properties. The theory’s success in covering all and 
only authorized artworks is matched by its explanatory poverty. It pro-
vides no explanation of the reasons or constraints for proposing artworld 
membership, no explanation of the artworld’s history and structure or 
of the artworld’s relationship to the wider socio-cultural and politico-
economic world in which the artworld is embedded and by which the 
artworld is significantly shaped.
Somaesthetics at the Limits
15
Danto rejects the institutional theory as lacking explanatory value 
because of its historical emptiness. Ignoring Wolfflin’s insight that not 
every thing is possible at every time, the institutional theory fails to con-
sider the historical conditions that structure the artworld and that there-
fore shape and limit its participants’ actions in creating and interpreting 
art. It cannot explain why Warhol’s work would not have been accepted 
had Warhol produced it in fin-de-siècle Paris or quattrocento Florence but 
could be art in Manhattan in the 1960s. The explanation, Danto argues, 
depends on the history of art and art theory, since objects are artworks 
only if they can be interpreted as such by the artworld. Thus, the Brillo Box 
as a work of art required an interpretation to that effect, both creatively 
by Warhol and responsively by his audience; and the artworld “required 
a certain historical development” to make that interpretation possible.21 
And since the artworld is but an abstraction from the artistic, critical, 
historiographical and theoretical practices that constitute art’s history, 
art is essentially a complex historical practice that must be defined and 
understood historically.
So far so good; but Danto also insists on viewing the structure and his-
tory of the artworld simply in terms of “its own internal development,” 
in essential isolation from history’s wider social and cultural contexts, 
economic factors, and political struggles. This compartmentalization 
from the rest of life is part and parcel of Danto’s insistence that the dis-
tinction between art and reality is absolute. But, as Danto surely knows, 
relations between the wider lifeworld are significantly formative of di-
rections in the artworld. Why was it Warhol’s Brillo Boxes rather than 
Duchamp’s much earlier objets trouvés (or readymades) that so strongly 
captured Danto and the wider public’s interest and thus more decisively 
transformed our notion of contemporary art? Is not the wider social and 
cultural revolution of the 1960s part of the explanation, along with the 
ever-increasing power of consumerist culture and of popular media cul-
ture to which Warhol himself was so attached? How can we explain the 
emergence of graffiti art and the work of Keith Haring and Jean-Michel 
Basquiat without looking to social and cultural movements such as hip 
hop that were initially beyond the established limits of the established 
artworld? 
By faithfully representing our established concept of art and insisting 
on its objects’ radical distinction from “mere real things,” Danto’s theory 
best realizes the dual goals of wrapper definitions: accurate reflection and 
compartmental differentiation that set art apart from the rest of life.22 
My dissatisfaction with the value of these goals helped push me toward 
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the path of pragmatism. If all substantive decisions as to what counts as 
art are left to the internal decisions of the artworld as recorded by art his-
tory, then what useful purpose does simply reflecting those decisions in a 
philosophical formula serve, apart from appeasing the old philosophical 
urge for theory as mirroring reflection of the real?
The theoretical ideal of reflection originally had a point when reality 
was conceived in terms of fixed, necessary essences lying beyond ordi-
nary empirical understanding. For an adequate representation of this real 
would always remain valid and effective as a criterion for assessing ordi-
nary understanding and practice. But if art’s realities are the empirical and 
changing contingencies of art’s historical career, then the reflective model 
seems pointless. For here, theory’s representation neither penetrates be-
yond changing phenomena nor can sustain their changes. Instead, it must 
run a hopeless race of perpetual narrative revision, holding the mirror of 
reflective theory up to art’s changing nature by representing its history.23
But art’s mutable history need not be merely represented; pragmatism 
urges that it can also be made through theoretical interventions. So prag-
matism also rethinks the roles and limits of aesthetic theory and philo-
sophy. No longer content with simply analyzing realities and concepts, 
it seeks to improve them and thereby promote better experience. But 
doesn’t such theoretical activism mean abandoning philosophy alto gether 
by forsaking its traditional project and self-image as the wholly disinter-
ested pursuit of truth? First, philosophy’s most powerful achievements 
were not always, if ever, really governed by this goal. Certainly Plato’s 
theory cannot be seen as disinterestedly representing the nature of art. 
It was clearly a politically motivated response to the pressing problem of 
whose intellectual leadership (art’s ancient wisdom or philosophy’s new 
rationality) should guide Athenian society at a time of troubled change, 
political dissension, and military defeat. Secondly, the very ideal of pure, 
neutral reflection typically disguises an impure bias. Fixation on the facts 
often reflects the interest of a conservatism that is happy to reinforce 
the status quo by representing it in definition, or is simply too timid to 
take part in the messy struggle over the shaping of culture. The fetishism 
of disinterested knowledge obscures the truth that philosophy’s ultimate 
aim is to benefit human life rather than serving pure truth for truth’s 
sake. If art and aesthetic experience are crucial forms of human flourish-
ing, then philosophy betrays its role if it merely looks on with neutrality 
without joining the struggle to extend their breadth and power.
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IV
For such reasons I turned from analytic philosophy to pragmatism, while 
also enlisting insights from hermeneutics, critical theory, and poststruc-
turalism that challenge in different ways some of the assumptions and 
limits of analytic aesthetics: its fetishized concern with precisely defin-
ing art’s objects that are presumed to have a fixed identity, unity, and 
ontology; its exaggerated sense of art’s demarcation from the rest of life 
and its autonomy from wider social and political forces that in fact pen-
etrate even into the very forms of artistic expression; and its essentially 
descriptivist conceptual approach that typically eschews revisionary pro-
jects and socio-political engagement so as to represent and reinforce the 
established cultural status quo.24 
If analytic theory is essentially demarcational – seeking to define by 
delimiting the concepts it analyzes in terms of wrapper definitions of ex-
tension, then the pragmatism I practice tries to be more transformational 
in style. Though beginning with a recognition of the established mean-
ings and limits of the concepts it treats, the pragmatist examines whether 
a concept’s range can be usefully extended (or narrowed) in places where 
its borders seem vague and flexible enough to allow such extension (or 
restriction) without destroying the concept’s principal meaning and value 
but rather making it more meaningful and useful in improving our aes-
thetic understanding and experience. Recognizing that Dewey’s defini-
tion of art as experience was hopelessly inadequate as an extensional or 
wrapper theory, I argued (in Pragmatist Aesthetics) that it was nonetheless 
useful as a transformational theory that by emphasizing aesthetic experi-
ence could not only break the hold of object fetishism in contemporary 
art, aesthetics, and culture but could also be used to help acquire artistic 
legitimacy for popular arts (such as rap music) that provided powerful 
aesthetic experience but were not yet granted genuine aesthetic or artistic 
status. 
My own subsequent proposal to define art as dramatization was like-
wise not at all aimed at perfect wrapper coverage of the extension of art 
but instead to highlight two crucial aspects of art – intensity of presence 
and formal framing – that have generated conflicting theories that divide 
contemporary aesthetics.25 The concept of dramatization connotes both 
intensity of meaningful appearance, action, or experience (which gener-
ates theories that define art in terms of immediate, captivating presence 
or experience). But it also connotes the formal framing of an action, ap-
pearance, or experience through a historically established conventional 
framework that differentiates what is framed from the ordinary flow of 
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life. This second feature lies at the core of contemporary theories that de-
fine art in terms of its historically constructed social differentiation from 
other realms, theories such as Pierre Bourdieu’s, Danto’s, and Dickie’s. In 
proposing the idea of art as dramatization, my aims were also transform-
ational in that the definition will take us beyond the conventional limits 
of established art by applying also to forms of ritual and athletics that dis-
play significant artistry and aesthetic experience but do not fall under the 
concept of art. It can also apply, as I have recently argued,26 to practices of 
love-making, the so-called erotic arts, whose status as art and potentional 
to provide intense and artistically dramatized aesthetic experience has 
been neglected in the West. Its exploration forms part of my current re-
search program in somaesthetics. 
V
Somaesthetics, of course, is a natural extension of my work in pragmatist 
aesthetics. Bringing aesthetics closer to the realm of life and practice, I 
realized, entails bringing the body more centrally into aesthetic focus, 
since all life and practice – all perception, cognition, and action – is cru-
cially performed through the body.27 Somaesthetics was thus conceived to 
complement the basic project of pragmatist aesthetics by elaborating the 
ways that a disciplined, ramified, and interdisciplinary attention to bodily 
experience, methods, discourses, and performances could enrich our aes-
thetic experience and practice, not only in the fine arts but in the diverse 
arts of living. It originated as an attempt to go beyond the limits not only 
of Baumgarten’s neglect of somatic cultivation in his original project of 
aesthetic cultivation, but also beyond the rejection of body and desire 
that is so prominent in the Western tradition of philosophical aesthetics 
from Shaftesbury and Kant through Schopenhauer and into the present, 
despite the fact that body and desire are so prominent in Western art and 
literature, even in its religious forms. 
Somaesthetics also involves an attempt to go beyond the conventional 
limits of philosophical aesthetics as mere theory by insisting on a prac-
tical dimension of actual cultivation of somatic discipline, though we 
should remember that Baumgarten originally conceived aesthetics as 
a discipline that one practiced not only in theory but through practical 
aesthetic exercises. Finally, somaesthetics, even in its more theoretical 
pursuits, goes beyond the typical disciplinary limits of philosophy by en-
listing also a var iety of disciplines (such as history, sociology, cosmetics, 
anatomy, medi tative and martial arts, physiology, nutrition, kinesiology, 
psychology, and neuroscience) that can be helpful in understanding the 
Somaesthetics at the Limits
19
experience and use of one’s body in appreciative perception, aesthetic 
performance, and creative self-fashioning and for examining the methods 
of improving such experience and use. Anatomy and kinesiology, for ex-
ample, can help explain how greater flexibility in the spine and ribcage 
can increase one’s range of vision by enabling greater rotation of the head, 
while, on the other hand, more intelligent use of the eyes can conversely 
(through their occipital muscles) improve the head’s rotation and event-
ually the spine’s. 
Some critics have expressed the worry that this breaking out of phil-
osophy’s disciplinary limits risks making somaesthetics an incoherent 
and unstructured field with no center relating to aesthetics. In particular, 
the interest in natural science is feared as an invasive impertinence to 
aesthetic theory. But I believe that aesthetic research should be properly 
informed by the best relevant scientific knowledge, and the sciences 
that explain somatic functioning are surely relevant to the question of 
enhancing somatic experience, use, and beauty. Renaissance art and art 
theory provide a good precedent for the use of science, since they clearly 
owe much of their success to the study of anatomy, mathematics, and 
the optics of perspective. The central, structuring focus of somaesthet-
ics is the body’s use in appreciative perception (aisthesis) and aesthetic 
self-fashioning, and there are certainly many matters that fall outside its 
limits. Issues in formal logic and income tax hardly seem to pertain to the 
field, but there is little point to outlaw their possible relevance a priori 
from the outset. If some aspect of knowledge can be convincingly shown 
to relate importantly and productively to somaesthetics’ central concerns, 
then somaesthetics can reinterpret or extend its borders at that precise 
place to take it in, recognizing that limits (just like concepts) can still func-
tion when they are flexible and vague. Somaesthetics, moreover, contains 
some structuring distinctions that provide some flexible and somewhat 
overlapping borders within the field. The different branches of analytic 
somaesthetics (essentially descriptive theory), pragmatic somaesthetics 
(comparative evaluation of methodologies of practice), and practical 
somaesthetics (actual performance of somatic disciplines) have already 
been elaborated by me too often to warrant repetition here. 
 Instead I wish to close by briefly considering another kind of limit with 
which somaesthetics is concerned and which has been especially empha-
sized by some important contemporary French philosophers, such as 
Georges Bataille and Michel Foucault. It is not so much a conceptual limit 
or disciplinary boundary but an experiential one, which they sometimes 
call “limit-experience” (expérience-limite) and which they describe as an 
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experience of violent intensity typically involving some violent form of 
somatic transgression that is also typically a transgression of moral as 
well as somatic norms.28 The value of these limit-experiences lies not sim-
ply in their experiential intensity that seems related to the intense sublim-
ities of aesthetic experience, but in their power to transform us by show-
ing us the limits of our conventional experience and subjectivity and by 
introducing us to something fascinatingly powerful beyond those limits, 
an “au delà” of what we are and know. Is somaesthetics com mitted to 
such limit-experiences? And what would such commitment imply about 
its general viability and value – in pragmatic, ethical, social, and health-
related terms?
Certainly somaesthetics is committed to studying the use of such forms 
of limit-experiences, but that does not imply a commitment to advocating 
them as the best way to enlarge our somaesthetic capacities and to achieve 
wider transformational improvements of our selves and self-knowledge. 
In fact, there is growing evidence from recent studies in psychology and 
neurophysiology that indicate the dangers of such sensory violence for 
our powers and pleasures of perception. These studies reinforce perspec-
tives of the old Weber-Fechner law of psychophysics which explain how 
increased intensity of stimulus reduces the power to perceive and appreci-
ate smaller sensory differences – thus tending to generate a spiral affect 
where ever stronger stimulation is demanded to meet the rising sensory 
thresholds, habits, and needs. Somaesthetics can therefore involve also 
a critique of the limits (cognitive, aesthetic, as well as practical, moral, 
and social) of these violent limit experiences, while also exploring other 
limit-experiences that deploy more gentle, subtle means to probe a wide 
range of somaesthetic limits (limits of sensory attention, somatic flexibil-
ity, habitual breathing rhythms, and muscular tensions) that can equally 
achieve powerful experiences of transformative exultation that expand 
the self.  
Moreover, somaesthetics should not limit itself to the realm of ecstatic 
limit-experiences. There is a range of different somaesthetic limits that 
we fail to appreciate in everyday life, and a better experiential knowledge 
of them could significantly improve the ways we live. Lacking the sen-
sitivity to sense these limits – such as the border between satiating our 
hunger and being full, between engaging perceptual interest and over-
stimulation, between proper tonus for postural poise and excessive mus-
cular contraction – has led all too much of our population to problems of 
obesity, insomnia, and chronic back pain. We often do not perceive these 
borders because our somaesthetic awareness has not been sufficiently 
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sharpened and sensitized to grasp them. These problems of recognizing 
limits might be called the somaesthetic pathologies of everyday life, and it 
is the topic I would have discussed today, had my friend Morten Kyndrup 
not asked me to provide a fuller overview of my exploration of the limits 
of aesthetics.
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